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This paper investigates the optimal acquisition strategy of a foreign investor, who wants
to acquire one out of two local rms, under incomplete information. The response to
acquisition oers is also a signal on rm productivity, aecting future competition.
We identify a competition eect (rms compete for acquisition) and a revelation ef-
fect (rms reveal their productivities). These eects reduce the rejection prots and
increase the acceptance probability. If the investor makes simultaneous oers, the rev-
elation eect is a potential threat because a rm may signal low productivity, but may
not be acquired. If, however, the investor makes oers sequentially, this threat does
not exist, making sequential oers the optimal acquisition strategy.
Keywords: Multinational Firms; Acquisition; Incomplete Information
JEL Classication: F23; G34
1 Introduction
In this paper, we ask the question how an investor should design an acquisition process
under incomplete information when there is more than just one target rm. The investor
is a foreign rm intending to enter a certain market. In order to enter the market, the
investor has to acquire a local rm but the local rms' production costs are private
information. The innovation of the paper is that the acquisition process may reveal some
information about the rival-to-be which potentially improves the investor's competitive
position in the marketplace because all rms update their beliefs about their rivals'
production cost with any relevant information revealed during the acquisition process.
We allow the investor to choose from several acquisition designs: make sequential oers
to two local rms, or make either an identical oer or dierentiated oers to two local
rms simultaneously. Our main result is that making sequential oers is the optimal
acquisition design because it balances competition between the targets and the threat of
revealing information such that the foreign rm's prots cannot improve by any other
setup.
University of Tubingen.
University of Tubingen, University of Adelaide and CESifo.
2The empirical analysis of multinational entry to foreign markets has demonstrated
that multinational rms enter foreign markets in many dierent ways; see, for exam-
ple, Ra et al. (2012) for Japanese foreign direct investment. Firm acquisitions play an
important role for cross-border activities of multinational rms, but information asym-
metries seem to restrict the scope of these activities. For example, Shen and Reuer
(2005) demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, private targets are less preferred compared to
public rms because they oer less information on assets. So why does not the standard
revelation mechanism of the principal-agent theory work in this setup? One reason is
that a foreign rm is not restricted to making oers just to one target rm. In the case
of multiple oers, however, the outcome of the acquisition process itself, in particular the
information obtained from potential targets that are not acquired, has an eect on the
post-acquisition market game. Thus, targets that have not been selected by an investor
do not play a passive role, but the option that they could have been acquired changes the
nature of the acquisition game substantially as we will demonstrate in this paper. The
empirical signicance of our analysis is obvious as cross-border mergers and acquisitions
are quantitatively signicant. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development 's report (UNCTAD, 2006), in the period 1999-2001 and since 2005 more
than six thousand cross-border mergers and acquisitions were undertaken annually. This
number only includes successful ones; the total number of merger/acquisition proposals,
in the same period, can be expected to be much larger because of a high rate of merger
failures; see, for example, Banal-Esta~nol and Seldeslachts (2011).
In the existing literature on mergers and acquisitions, rms' acquisition strategies
and bargaining processes are often simplied by either implicitly or explicitly assuming
a single oer to a single target only, or by employing an exogenous bargaining process.1
Most of the studies in the literature on mergers and acquisitions concentrate on rms' in-
centives to merge under complete information.2 As for asymmetric information, Qiu and
Zhou (2006) study international mergers such that local rms have better information
on market demand than foreign rms do. They argue that this information asymmetry
generates incentives for rms from dierent countries to merge. Banal-Esta~nol (2007)
also nds that uncertainty may increase merger incentives and decrease free-riding ef-
1The literature on endogenous mergers includes alternative approaches such as simultaneous
bidding as in Kamien and Zang (1990, 1991), sequential bidding as in Kamien and Zang (1993),
and sequential voting on mergers as in Rodrigues (2001) and Zhou (2008).
2For instance, Salant et al. (1983) study the protability of a merger of a subset of rms
competing in quantities and nd that rms have no incentive to merge unless the merger
includes 80 per cent of all rms in the industry. Stigler (1950) also argues that rms may
benet from not participating in a merger when some other rms are merging. Hennessy (2000)
replaces linear demand (assumed by Salant et al., 1983) with convex demand and shows that
merging rms benet from the reduction in competition even when there are no cost eciencies.
By allowing for product dierentiation and considering Bertrand competition, Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) also show that mergers of any size are protable. In a Cournot oligopoly,
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) investigate necessary and sucient conditions for horizontal mergers
to raise price. Perry and Porter (1985) show that rms may have incentives to merge and there
is no need to include 80 per cent of rms in the industry when eciency gains are generated.
3fects. Zhou (2008) studies endogenous mergers under cost uncertainty and shows that
mergers occur if, and only if, uncertainty is large.
The purpose of this study is to make some progress by endogenizing the acquisition
process further under incomplete information when there is more than just one target
rm. For this purpose, we look upon acquisitions and not on mergers. While these terms
are often used equivalently, we think that a merger is about combining complementary
assets of two rms which negotiate on the merger terms on a level playing eld. In that
case, the degree of asset complementarity plays an important role. An acquisition of a
rm is a complete takeover, and is by nature not an activity between equal partners.
Thus, we understand an acquisition of a rm as an entry strategy and browneld invest-
ment, and for this reason we abstract from combining complementary assets determining
potential merger protability. We assume that the investor can successfully carry over
his technology to the acquired rm. The empirical background is that this assumption
is consistent with the observation that full acquisitions are more likely if the acquirer's
productivity is relatively large compared to the target rm (Ra et al., 2009).
Our study is closely related to Hviid and Prendergast (1993). They examine the
inuence of a failing acquisition proposal on rms' ex post protability. They consider a
potential merger between two rms and assume that the rm making the proposal does
not know the target rm's protability. The proposal fails if the oer is less than the
target rm's prot given rejection (that is, its prot if it rejects the oer and competes
against the bidding rm). They show that an unsuccessful proposal may increase the
target rm's prot. By rejecting the merger proposal, the target rm signals that it is a
low-cost rm, and the bidder updates its beliefs and expects less prots.3 In their study,
the rm making a proposal has no choice except to make a single oer to the existing
target rm because there is only one target by assumption.4 In our paper, however, the
foreign rm is a technology leader, faces two potential target rms and may choose from
various acquisition strategies. Each acquisition strategy has important implications for
both the foreign rm's proposal and the target rms' willingness to accept an oer,
which we scrutinize in this paper.
Our model identies two eects which play a role in this setup. Including one other
rm creates a competition eect because the investor does not have to stay out of the
market when the oer is rejected by a single rm. This reduces the rejection prots
and increases the acceptance probability. Oers to two rms also create a revelation
eect, such that rejection/acceptance of the oer conveys information about the rms'
protabilities, and changes rms' beliefs about the intensity of competition in the post-
acquisition market. If oers are made sequentially, a rejected oer signals high pro-
3Dassiou and Holl (1996), however, consider Bertrand competition and allow for product
dierentiation, and show that information revealed by the target rm rejecting the proposal
negatively aects not only the bidding rm, but the target rm as well.
4Assuming a single target and two asymmetrically informed bidders for the target, Povel
and Singh (2006) study takeovers as bidding contests and scrutinize the target's optimal selling
mechanism. Their model, however, does not consider downstream externalities in a post-
acquisition market, so bidders' valuations are not endogenous.
4ductivity, and low productivity types are acquired. If oers are made simultaneously,
however, this eect implies a risk: there is a chance that both rms unilaterally accept
the oer, but only one rm is acquired, in which case the non-acquired rm has revealed
its relative weakness and will have to compete against the strong rm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in
Section 2. In Section 3, we scrutinize the case of sequential oers. In Section 4, we solve
the model for the case of simultaneous oers. We conclude in Section 5. For convenience,
we have relegated most proofs and technical details to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a market that is served by two rms, labeled 1 and 2. Consumers in this
market have quasi-linear preferences which give rise to the inverse demand function
p = a  (q1+ q2), where p denotes the equilibrium price, and q1 and q2 are the respective
outputs of the two rms. We assume a > 2, which guarantees that both rms always
want to produce in equilibrium. The production costs are private information of the
rms, and both rms draw their cost from the uniform distribution F (c) = c: production
costs are distributed between 0 and unity. Firms compete by quantities a la Cournot.
A foreign rm, which is a technology leader in this industry, considers the acquisition
of one of these rms in order to enter the market.5 Similar as in Barros (1998) and Borek
et al. (2004), this investor will use his technology after the acquisition, and we normalize
the investor's production cost to zero which is common knowledge amongst all rms,
making the investor technologically superior. Before we turn to acquisition strategies,
we have to determine the optimal outputs and maximized prots in this market. To
this end, we have to take into account that an acquisition proposal, either rejected or
accepted, signals a certain range or even the exact cost of one or both competitors in this
market. Consider rm 1 which maximizes its expected prot 1 = (a q1 E1 (q2) c1)q1,
where q1 denotes rm 1's output and E1 (q2) is rm 1's expectation of rm 2's output.
The rst-order conditions imply optimal output levels:
q1 =
a  E1 (q2)  c1
2
;(1a)
q2 =
a  E2 (q1)  c2
2
:(1b)
5The model is set up such that the foreign rm is allowed to acquire only a single rm: local
competition authorities would not permit the foreign rm to gain monopoly power. We could
easily extend our model to other entry options like greeneld investment as long as the foreign
investor has to choose between these options at the same time. In this case, the greeneld
option would just add a participation constraint to our model with little dierence for our
results. Results would dier had the greeneld option still been available after having the
negotiations with all target rms failed. However, any greeneld investment seems to require
a long lead time, and empirical evidence on Japanese foreign direct investment suggests that
decisions on acquisitions and greeneld investment are not made sequentially (Ra et al., 2012).
5Firm 1 does not know rm 2's cost, but it correctly anticipates the optimal behavior
of the rival rm: E1E2 (q1) = E2 (q1) and E2E1 (q2) = E1 (q2).
6 Note that E2(c1) =
E1(c2) = 1=2 only if no information has been revealed during the acquisition stage
which should warrant a Bayesian update. Accordingly, rm 1 anticipates that
E1 (q2) =
a  E1E2 (q1)  E1(c2)
2
=
a 

a  E2E1 (q2)  E2(c1)
2

  E1(c2)
2
which leads to
E2 (q1) =
a+ E1(c2)  2E2(c1)
3
;(2a)
E1 (q2) =
a+ E2(c1)  2E1(c2)
3
:(2b)
Substituting (2) back into (1) yields the optimal outputs as a function of rm-specic
and expected costs which are given by
q1 =
2a  E2(c1) + 2E1(c2)  3c1
6
;(3a)
q2 =
2a  E1(c2) + 2E2(c1)  3c2
6
:(3b)
Note that a > 2 guarantees that outputs are positive even if E i(ci) = ci = 1 and
Ei(c i) = 0 where i = f1; 2g. Since the rst-order conditions imply that p   ci =
 p0qi = q2i , we can also derive the expected prots:
1 =

2a  E2(c1) + 2E1(c2)  3c1
6
2
;(4a)
2 =

2a  E1(c2) + 2E2(c1)  3c2
6
2
:(4b)
In equation (4), 1 and 

2 are, respectively, rm 1's and rm 2's expected prots
in equilibrium; and c1 and c2 are, respectively, rm 1's and rm 2's realized production
costs. As is clear from equation (4), a rm's expected prot is positively related to its
expectation of its rival's cost and is negatively related to the rival rm's expectation
of its own cost. Hence, if the rival rm reveals that it is a low-cost rm, the expected
prot of the other rm decreases and its expected prot increases, ceteris paribus, as the
other rm updates its beliefs. In what follows, we will scrutinize the optimal acquisition
strategies of the investor.
6EiEj (qi), i 6= j, is rm i's anticipation of rm j's expectation of rm i's output, qi.
63 Sequential oers
In case of sequential oers, without loss of generality, let the foreign rm pick rm 1 and
make the rst oer to this rm. Let 1 denote the foreign rm's oer. If rm 1 accepts
this oer, it is acquired by the foreign rm, which will produce in this market with
zero cost. Hence, rm 2 observes the acquisition and updates its beliefs about rm 1's
cost: E2 (c1) = 0. The foreign rm does not learn anything about rm 2's protability:
E1 (c2) = 1=2. Accordingly, the expected prots are given by
1 =

2a+ 1
6
2
;(5a)
2 =

2a  1=2  3c2
6
2
:(5b)
If rm 1 rejects the oer, the foreign rm makes another oer to the other rm which
creates a competition eect, because there is a chance that the other rm accepts the
investor's oer, and that the rm receiving and rejecting the rst-stage oer competes
against the stronger rm. This threat, which is possible only because another target rm
exists, will lead to a decrease in the local rm's expected rejection prots. Let 1 denote
the type of rm that is indierent between acceptance and rejection of the rst-stage
oer 1: In equilibrium, all rms with a higher (lower) production cost than 1 will be
shown to accept (reject) this oer. Consequently, if rm 1 rejects the oer, it will signal
that it is a low-cost rm which will lead the foreign rm and rm 2 to update their
beliefs such that E2 (c1) = 1=2. Let 2 denote the oer that the foreign rm makes to
rm 2 after its rst oer 1 is rejected by rm 1. If rm 2 accepts 2, then rm 1 will
have to compete against the foreign rm. Firm 1 observes the acquisition in this case
and updates its beliefs such that E1 (c2) = 0, leading to the expected prots:
1 =
0@2a  12   3c1
6
1A2 ;(6a)
2 =

2a+ 1
6
2
:(6b)
Note that 1, given by equation (6a), decreases with c1; which conrms our sorting
assumption that high (low)-cost rms accept (reject) the oer. There is of course also a
possibility that rm 2 rejects the oer. Let 2 denote the type of rm that is indierent
between acceptance and rejection of the second-stage oer 2: If rm 2 rejects the oer,
then no acquisition will take place. The two local rms will compete against each other.
In this case, also rm 2 signals that it is a low-cost rm. Hence, rm 1 updates its
beliefs: E1 (c2) = 2=2. Accordingly, the expected prots are given by:
1 =
0@2a  12 + 2   3c1
6
1A2 ;(7a)
72 =
0@2a  22 + 1   3c2
6
1A2 :(7b)
This is a sequential Bayesian game, which we solve using backward induction. In the
second stage, rm 2 knows 1 as it is signaled by rm 1, rejecting the initial oer 1.
Hence, 1 is determined in the rst stage and given in the second stage, denoted by 1:
In equilibrium, rm 2 accepts the oer 2 if its realized production cost c2 is higher than
the critical type 2 which is indierent between acceptance and rejection of the oer (see
equation (7b)) such that
(8) 2 (2; 1) =
0@2a  22 + 1   32
6
1A2 = 4a+ 21   72
12
2
:
This indierence condition species the acquisition oer of the foreign rm in the second
stage as a function of the critical type in the rst stage 1 and the critical type in the
second stage 2. Clearly, 2 decreases with 2. This stage is just like a single oer with
one exception: rm 1 has already revealed that it is a low-cost rm; the second stage
can be reached if, and only if, rm 1 rejects the foreign rm's initial oer. The lower the
cost range rm 1 signals - indicated by 1 - the smaller the prot rm 2 expects in case
of rejecting the oer, because the potential rival will be expected to be a stronger rm.
If the foreign rm has made a completely exclusive oer in the rst-stage such that any
type would reject the oer (1 = 1), the second stage is, then, merely the single oer
case, because there will be no competition eect, nor will there be any revelation eect
that comes from the rst stage. The revelation eect decreases the expected rejection
prot. When negotiating with a rm, the investor benets from a decrease in the rm's
reservation price, making the oer and/or rejection rate smaller. Moreover, the optimal
rejection rate in the second stage increases with a, because an increase in a indicates a
larger protability of the market which favors the rm's outside option.
We now turn to the rst stage. Firm 1's expected prot in the case of accepting the
oer is 1. If, however, rm 1 rejects the oer, its expected prot is equal to
(9) 2
0@2a  12 + 2   3c1
6
1A2 + (1  2)
0@2a  12   3c1
6
1A2 ;
where 2 is the optimal rejection rate in the second period. In expression (9), the rst
part is the outcome if the other rm rejects the oer, which is equal to its probability
2 times the expected prot of rm 1 competing against the other local rm. Similarly,
the second part is the outcome if the other rm accepts the oer, which is equal to its
probability (1  2) times the expected prot of rm 1 competing against the foreign
rm. In equilibrium, rm 1 will accept (reject) the oer 1 if its realized production
cost c1 is more (less) than the critical type 1 for whom the expected acceptance prot
81 must be equal to the expected rejection prot, given by expression (9), such that
(10) 1 (1) = 

2

4a+ 22   71
12
2
+ (1  2)

4a  71
12
2
:
The RHS of (10) clearly shows that the competition eect decreases rm 1's reservation
price, because rm 1 cannot make sure whether it will compete against the other local
rm or against the investor unless it accepts the investor's oer: the expected rejection
prot is, now, the weighted average of the expected prot in the case of competing
against the other rm and the smaller expected prot in the case of competing against
the lowest-cost investor. A direct implication of this is that the foreign rm can behave
more aggressively - compared to the single oer case - by making sequential oers and
eectively including the other rm in the game, in which case the foreign rm can benet
from both the revelation and the competition eect.
We are now ready to scrutinize the foreign rm's optimal acquisition policy in the
case of sequential oers. Let 
1(2 )
0 denote the foreign rm's expected prot which is
given by equation (11):

1(2)
0 = (1  1)
 
2a+ 1
6
2
  1 (1)
!
(11)
+1 (1  2)
 
2a+ 1
6
2
 

4a+ 21   72
12
2!
where the rst term is the expected rst-period prot, and the second term is the
expected second-period prot. It is, now, straightforward to show:
Lemma 1 If the rst-stage oer is rejected, it is not optimal to exclude the other rm,
that is, the investor will make a second-stage oer which will be accepted by some type.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The foreign rm will not use the single oer strategy, which is a special case of sequential
oers, because it increases its expected prots by eectively including the two rms in
the game.7 The intuition is that the rm approached rst knows that if it rejects the
oer, the investor will approach the other rm which may accept the oer it will receive.
This is a threat that reduces the rst rm's reservation price (the competition eect).
Moreover the rst rm rejects only if it is a lower-cost rm, which will be anticipated
by the second rm, and which will decrease the second rm's reservation price (the
revelation eect).
Why does the investor not want to increase the acceptance probability to one such
that it may enter with certainty, at least for the second stage? While the investor will
operate with zero marginal cost after entry, the dierence in costs to the local rms is
7The computations are available upon request.
9not too large, and actually would be zero if it faced the most ecient type. Guaranteeing
entry would warrant to make an oer such that any local rm, including the type that
has the same cost as the investor, will accept. However, this oer would not leave any
acquisition gain to the investor leading the investor to discriminate against very ecient
local rms, although this strategy could imply that none of the rms may eventually
accept an oer.
4 Simultaneous oers
In this section, we check whether the foreign rm can do better by making simultaneous
oers. We rst scrutinize the case that the foreign rm makes strictly dierent oers.
Then we look at a specic case: the foreign rm makes the same oer to both rms. This
section is of particular importance as it implies the possibility that both rms accept
the foreign rm's oer(s), but only one rm is picked by the foreign rm while the other
rm reveals some information about its protability. The two cases are dierent because
identical oers do not allow the foreign rm to distinguish between the two targets if
both targets accept the oer. Acceptance or rejection of the two dierent oers, however,
demonstrates a dierence in expected rm productivity.
For the case of dierent oers, note carefully that nothing stops the investor to
pick the rm having received the higher oer even if the other rm having received
the lower oer has unilaterally accepted the oer. As we discussed before, the investor
may prefer to take a potentially strong rival out of the market in order to compete
against a potentially weak rival. Our model will accommodate both options, but since
we will show that sequential oers will dominate simultaneous oers, we do not have
to scrutinize in which case the investor would want to acquire the potential low-cost
or high-cost rival. All we need is that both local rms understand which rm will be
acquired given a certain set of oers.
4.1 Dierent simultaneous oers
Let s1 and 
s
2 denote the oers that the foreign rm simultaneously makes to rms 1
and 2, respectively, where s1 6= s2. Also let s1 and s2 denote the critical types: any rm
of the type s1 is indierent between accepting and rejecting the oer 
s
1; and any rm
of the type s2 is indierent between accepting and rejecting the oer 
s
2. All rms with
a higher (lower) production cost than the critical type will accept (reject) the oer.
We may distinguish ve dierent outcomes depending on the two rms' acceptance
and rejection of the oers. On the rst of these, both rms 1 and 2 may reject the oers
s1 and 
s
2, respectively, which happens with probability 
s
1
s
2; no acquisition takes place.
In such a situation, both rms know that the other one has rejected the oer because it
is a low-cost rm, E i (ci) = si =2 < 1=2; i = f1; 2g, leading to the expected prots:
1 =
0B@2a  
s
1
2
+ s2   3c1
6
1CA
2
;(12a)
10
2 =
0B@2a  
s
2
2
+ s1   3c2
6
1CA
2
:(12b)
Another possible outcome is that only one rm accepts the oer it has received. This
happens with probability si
 
1  s i

, where the rejecting rm is denoted by i. In this
case, the foreign rm acquires the rm accepting its oer. Firms update their beliefs
about production costs such that Ei (c i) = 0 and E i (ci) = si =2. This leads to the
expected prots given by
1 =

2a+ s2
6
2
;(13a)
2 =
0B@2a  
s
2
2
  3c2
6
1CA
2
;(13b)
in case if rm 1 accepts s1 and rm 2 rejects 
s
2, or by
1 =
0B@2a  
s
1
2
  3c1
6
1CA
2
;(14a)
2 =

2a+ s1
6
2
;(14b)
in case if rm 1 rejects s1 and rm 2 accepts 
s
2.
Finally, there is a possibility that each rm unilaterally accepts the oer it has
received, which happens with probability (1  s1) (1  s2), and in which case the foreign
rm is free to acquire any rm. In this case, the revelation eect imposes a threat and
is of particular concern for each rm. Denoting the non-acquired rm by i, rm i's
unilateral acceptance of the oer will signal the foreign rm that it is a high-cost rm
such that E i (ci) = (1 + si ) =2 > 1=2, while rm i will learn that the rival rm will be
of the lowest-cost type such that Ei(c i) = 0 due to the acquisition of the rival rm.
The expected prots are given by
1 =

2a+ 1 + s2
6
2
;(15a)
2 =
0B@2a  1 + 
s
2
2
  3c2
6
1CA
2
;(15b)
in case if the foreign rm acquires rm 1, or by
1 =
0B@2a  1 + 
s
1
2
  3c1
6
1CA
2
;(16a)
11
2 =

2a+ 1 + s1
6
2
;(16b)
in case if the foreign rm acquires rm 2.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the foreign rm makes oers such that
it acquires rm 1 in case if both rms accept unilaterally. As mentioned before, rm 1
does not have to be the rm receiving the lower oer. Consequently, rm 1's expected
acceptance prot, denoted A1 (c1), is exactly the compensation it has been oered: 
s
1.
Firm 2, however, gets the compensation that it has been oered, s2, only if rm 1 rejects
the oer s1. So rm 2's expected acceptance prot, denoted 
A
2 , is equal to
A2 (c2) = 
s
1
s
2 + (1  s1)
0B@2a  1 + 
s
2
2
  3c2
6
1CA
2
:
The rst part is the outcome if the other rm rejects the oer: the probability rm 1
rejects s1 times the compensation rm 2 has been oered. Similarly, the second part is
the probability that rm 1 accepts the oer s1 times the expected prot of rm 2, given
rm 2 has revealed that it is a high-cost rm. It can be clearly seen from this expression
that the revelation eect reduces rm 2's incentive to accept the investor's oer as it
reduces the expected acceptance prots. On the contrary, rm 1's and rm 2's expected
rejection prots, denoted R1 and 
R
2 , respectively, are symmetric, such that
R1 (c1) = 
s
2
0B@2a  
s
1
2
+ s2   3c1
6
1CA
2
+ (1  s2)
0B@2a  
s
1
2
  3c1
6
1CA
2
;
R2 (c2) = 
s
1
0B@2a  
s
2
2
+ s1   3c2
6
1CA
2
+ (1  s1)
0B@2a  
s
2
2
  3c2
6
1CA
2
:
In each of the two expressions above, the rst part is the probability that also the rival
local rm rejects the foreign rm's oer times the respective expected prots, while the
second part is the probability that the rival local rm accepts the foreign rm's oer
times the expected prots in case of competing against the foreign rm. Unlike the case
of sequential oers - in which only the rm receiving the rst-stage oer is exposed to
the competition eect - both rms are directly subject to the competition eect in this
case. Dierentiation of Ai (ci) and 
R
i (ci) w.r.t. ci, i = f1; 2g, shows that
dA1 (c1)
dc1
= 0 >(17a)
dR1 (c1)
dc1
=   1
12
(4a  6c1   s1 + 2s2); and
dA2 (c2)
dc2
=  1  
s
1
12
(4a  6c2   s2   1) >(17b)
12
dR2 (c2)
dc2
=   1
12
(4a  6c2   s2 + 2s1):
Expression (17) conrms that rms with production costs lower (higher) than the re-
spective critical type si reject (accept) the compensation that they have been oered
because, when the production cost increases, the expected acceptance prots decrease
by less than the expected rejection prots. In equilibrium, the unilateral rejection rates
(si ) are determined by the indierence conditions, 
A
i (
s
i ) = 
R
i (
s
i ), i = f1; 2g:
s1(
s
1; 
s
2) = 
s
2

4a+ 2s2   7s1
12
2
+ (1  s2)

4a  7s1
12
2
;(18a)
s2(
s
1; 
s
2) =

4a+ 2s1   7s2
12
2
+
(1  s1)
s1
(8a  14s2   1)
144
:(18b)
The following remarks are in order. As is clear from equation (18), si decreases with 
s
i .
1, given by equation (10), and 
s
1, given by equation (18a), are qualitatively equivalent.
The reason is that rms are subject to similar eects: the competition eect and the
revelation eect. On the contrary, comparing 2, given by equation (8), and 
s
2, given by
equation (18b), shows that, with sequential instead of simultaneous oers, the investor
may acquire the same rm in the second stage with the same probability for a lower
compensation. This is mainly due to the revelation eect decreasing expected acceptance
prots which is not present in the case of sequential oers.
Although exclusion of a rm by making an oer which would be rejected by any type
is still not optimal as in the case of sequential oers (see Appendix A.2),8 we nd:
Proposition 1 The foreign rm's expected prot with sequential oers is higher than
that with dierent simultaneous oers.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
For this result, it is even immaterial whether the investor will go after the high-/low-cost
rm in case that both target rms accept unilaterally. So why do sequential oers do
better? In the sequential oers case, only one rm - the rm receiving the rst-stage
oer - is subject to the competition eect, whereas both rms are aected in the case of
dierent simultaneous oers, which certainly does work in the investor's favor. On the
contrary, by making dierent simultaneous oers, the investor reduces incentives of the
rm receiving an oer to accept. The reason is that acceptance is unilateral and may
not lead to acquisition, but to signaling the future rival that it is a high-cost rm. This
creates a signicant threat, which is not oset by the additional competition eect. It
deteriorates the probability of acceptance as it decreases the expected acceptance prot.
Thereby the investor's expected prots decrease. To complete the analysis, we next
scrutinize the case of identical simultaneous oers.
8Not surprisingly, dierent simultaneous oers also yield higher expected prots than a
single oer to only one rm. The computations are available upon request.
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4.2 Identical simultaneous oers
Unlike the dierent simultaneous oers case, the foreign rm now oers both rms
an identical compensation, and so there is a single critical type, denoted s, which is
indierent between acceptance and rejection of the oer. All rms with a higher (lower)
production cost than the critical type, s, accept (reject) the oer. The main dierence
to dierent simultaneous oers is that the investor cannot distinguish rms in terms of
their cost signals if both rms unilaterally accept the investor's oer. Thus, we assume
that it will select one of them with equal probability.
As before, both rms may reject the oer in which case no acquisition will take place
and both rms will know that the other one has rejected the oer because it is a low-cost
rm: E i (ci) = s=2 < 1=2, leading to the expected prots as in equation (12) where
we should replace s1 and 
s
2 by s. If one rm accepts and the other rm rejects the
oer, all rms update their beliefs such that Ei (c i) = 0 and E i (ci) = s=2, where the
rejecting rm is denoted by i. This leads to the expected prots as in either equation
(13) or (14), such that s1 and 
s
2 should be replaced by s.
Finally, both rms may unilaterally accept the investor's oer, in which case the
investor will determine which rm to acquire simply by tossing a coin. This outcome
is a potential threat to each rm as it may not be the rm picked by the investor, and
we can write the expected prots as in either equation (15) or (16), where, again, we
should replace s1 and 
s
2 by s.
Let us consider rm 1; similar expressions hold for rm 2. If rm 1 accepts the oer,
denoted s, its expected acceptance prot, denoted 
A
1 , is equal to
A1 (c1) = ss + (1  s)
0BB@12s + 12
0B@2a  1 + s2   3c1
6
1CA
2
1CCA :
The rst part is the outcome if the other rm rejects the oer, which is equal to its
probability s times the acquisition price s. If both rms accept the oer, which
happens with probability (1  s), two outcomes are possible: either rm 1 is picked
with probability 0:5 and rm 2 reveals that it is a high-cost rm, or rm 2 is picked
with probability 0:5 and rm 1 reveals that it is a high-cost rm. Clearly, both rms
are subject to the threat that neither of the rms can make sure that it will be acquired
by the investor should it unilaterally accept the oer. However, this threat, due to the
revelation eect, is now symmetric. If rm 1 rejects the oer, its expected rejection
prot, denoted by R1 , is equal to
R1 (c1) = s
0@2a+ s2   3c1
6
1A2 + (1  s)
0@2a  s2   3c1
6
1A2 :
The rst part is the probability that also rm 2 rejects the oer times the respective
expected prot. The second part is the probability that rm 2 accepts the oer times
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the expected prot of rm 1 competing against the investor. As in the case of dierent
simultaneous oers, both rms' reservation prices decrease with both the competition
and the revelation eect. Dierentiation of A1 (c1) and 
R
1 (c1) w.r.t. c1 shows
dA1 (c1)
dc1
=  1  s
24
(4a  6c1   s   1) >(19)
dR1 (c1)
dc1
=   1
12
(4a  6c1   s(1  2s)):
Expression (19) conrms that rms with a production cost lower (higher) than s reject
(accept) the oer because, when the production cost increases, the expected acceptance
prots decrease by less than the expected rejection prots. In equilibrium, the unilateral
rejection rate s is determined by the indierence condition 
A
1 (s) = 
R
1 (s):
(20)
1 + s
2
s +
1  s
2

4a  1  7s
12
2
= s

4a  5s
12
2
+ (1  s)

4a  7s
12
2
)
(1+s)s = 2
 
s

4a  5s
12
2
+ (1  s)

4a  7s
12
2!
 (1 s)

4a  1  7s
12
2
:
The expected prot of the foreign rm takes into account three dierent outcomes: (i)
both rms accept the oer s, which happens with probability (1   s)2; (ii) one rm
accepts and the other rm rejects the oer, which happens with probability 2s(1  s);
and (iii) no rm accepts the oer, which happens with probability 2s . In the rst case,
the foreign rm learns that the future rival is a high-cost type in the range between s
and 1. In the second case, it learns that the future rival is a low-cost type in the range
between 0 and s. In the last case, no oer is successful, so revealed information is
irrelevant for the foreign rm as it stays out of the market. In this case, only the target
rms will make use of the revealed information and update their beliefs before competing
against each other. The foreign rm pays the acquisition price s with probability
(1   s)2 + 2s(1   s) = (1  2s ). Let s0 denote the foreign rm's expected prot,
which is given by:
(21) s0 (s) = (1  s)2

2a+ 1 + s
6
2
+ 2s(1  s)

2a+ s
6
2
  (1  2s )s
= (1  s)
 
(1  s)

2a+ 1 + s
6
2
+ 2s

2a+ s
6
2
  (1 + s)s
!
;
where (1 + s)s is given by (20). We can write the rst-order condition that should
hold in equilibrium such that
(22)
@s0 (s)
@s
=
1
36
(3 + 14a)  ks = 0;
where k = (8a+28+ s(20a  35+ 2s))=24. Comparing the investor's expected prots
leads to
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Theorem 1 The foreign rm's expected prot is highest with sequential oers. In case
of simultaneous oers, its expected prot with dierent simultaneous oers is higher than
that with identical simultaneous oers.
Proof: See Appendices A.3 and A.4.
Neither complete exclusion nor complete inclusion of rms via trivial oers - such that
any type would either reject or accept such oers - is optimal also in case of identical
simultaneous oers (see Appendix A.2): eectively including the two rms in the game
by making identical simultaneous oers substantially improves the probability of accep-
tance of the oer, and signicantly decreases the expected cost of the acquisition of a
rm. In case of identical simultaneous oers, however, the revelation eect imposes a
threat for both rms, such that their acceptance of the oer does not necessarily lead
to the acquisition of the rm. Due to the dierent quality of the revelation eect, rms'
expected acceptance prots are no longer equal to the oer, but the weighted average of
the oer and the smaller expected outside prots. Dierent simultaneous oers improve
on the investor's expected prots because they allow the investor to learn the dierence
in cost types of the target rms, but they keep the threat of accepting unilaterally but
not being acquired by the foreign rm which is not present when oers are sequential.
The target rms are, thus, more inclined to reject simultaneous oers.
5 Concluding remarks
Our paper has made some progress on explaining a potential sequence of oers when
a foreign investor wants to acquire a local rm, but has incomplete information about
the targets' protabilities. We could show that sequencing oers is better than making
simultaneous oers. In both cases, acceptance or rejection of an oer has a revelation
eect. Furthermore, both target rms compete for the investor in particular because
they do not want to compete against the investor if the rival rm is acquired. Sequential
oers do best because the revelation eect does not impose a counter-productive threat.
An implicit assumption of our analysis has been that an investor could credibly commit
to a certain policy. This may be regarded as most problematic in the case of a single oer
to only one rm. That said, this strategy will never be used, and thus the credibility
of the investor committed to talk to only one rm will never be tested. Therefore,
our results indicate that there is no conict between credibility and the best strategy.
Furthermore, we have conned our analysis to a setup in which one active agent (the
foreign investor) makes oers and two other agents (the targeted local rms) respond by
acceptance or rejection of the investor's oer(s). Our analysis could be easily extended
to the case where more than two rms are active, but maximally two of them qualify as
a potential target. If there are more than two potential targets, the analysis gets much
more complicated and analytically unsolvable, while having similar dynamics at work.
This paper has scrutinized the optimal acquisition strategies of an investor. An
alternative setup could be that the investor runs an auction: both local rms submit
their sale prices to the investor, and the investor commits to acquire the rm quoting
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a lower price.9 While this seems to be a straightforward setup, several complications
may arise. If bids revealed rms' realized costs, then the auction would reveal also the
type of the non-acquired rm, and this would add an incentive to conceal the type.
This incentive is strongest when the auction is not self-enforcing (when the investor's ex
ante commitment to acquire the rm asking for a lower acquisition price is not credible
ex post). As the outcome of the auction is important also for the post-auction market
(the competition stage of the game), after having seen the quoted prices, the investor
may decide to acquire the rm having quoted a higher price instead. The reason is that
- once costs are known - it may be more protable to take out a strong rival and to
compete against a weak rival. The problem even arises in an environment of complete
information. In this setup, the foreign rm can select which rm it would like to acquire.
Suppose the market potential (proxied by a) is relatively small. In this case, it is in the
investor's best interest to acquire the strong (low-cost) rm and to compete against the
weak (high-cost) rm. If a is small, duopoly prots are small, and the prot dierence
between a low-cost and a high-cost rm is not signicantly large. The investor has to
compensate the acquired rm for the foregone prot, and in this case it pays o to
eliminate a strong rival from future competition and to compete against a weak rival. In
suciently large markets - a is large - the investor acquires the high-cost rm as it will
be signicantly cheaper. While the protability of this option depends on the market
potential in case of complete information, it has the implication that no pure-strategy,
symmetric and fully-separating Nash equilibrium will exist in an auction setup with
incomplete information.10 Local rms will anticipate that this defection will improve
the investor's competitive position in the post-auction market. Thus, we conclude that
several complications arise in alternative setups which would deserve an own paper. This
would also be true if we considered mergers instead of acquisitions because a potential
asset complementarity will obviously lead to more ambiguity in partner selection.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let 20 denote the foreign rm's expected prot in the second stage. It is a function of
the critical type in the rst stage, 1, and the second-stage rejection rate, 2:
20 (2; 1) = (1  2)
 
2a+ 1
6
2
 

4a+ 21   72
12
2!
:
Note that 20 (0; ) = 0. The rst derivative is given by
(A.1)
@20 (2; )
@2
=
7
144
 
4 (2a+ 1)  2 (7 + 8a+ 41) 2 + 2122

;
9For the literature on negotiations versus auctions, see Bulow and Klemperer (1996).
10See Koska et al. (2014) for details. This result has some similarity with the ratchet eect.
For the ratchet eect in a dynamic procurement model with adverse selection and moral hazard,
see Laont and Tirole (1988).
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which leads us to
@20 (2; )
@2

2=0
=
7
36
(2a+ 1) > 0;
@20 (2; )
@2

2=1
=   7
36

2a+ 1  
7
4

< 0
because a > 2. Thus, an optimal second-stage oer cannot be completely exclusive
such that any type will reject the oer, nor can it be completely inclusive such that any
type will accept the oer. From equation (A.1), we can derive a closed form solution
for the optimal second-stage rejection rate 2 which is a decreasing function of 1:
2 (1) =

2 (7 + 8a+ 41) 
q
 336 (2a+ 1) + 4 (7 + 8a+ 41)2
.
42. Q.E.D.
A.2 Completely exclusive/inclusive simultaneous oers

s1 ;
s
2
0 , the foreign rm's expected prot for dierent simultaneous oers, is given by
(A.2) 
s1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1; 
s
2) = (1  s1)
 
s2

2a+ s2
6
2
+ (1  s2)

2a+ s2 + 1
6
2
  s1
!
+
s1(1  s2)
 
2a+ s1
6
2
  s2
!
;
where si ; i = f1; 2g, is given by equation (18), and 
s
1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1 = 1; 
s
2 = 0) = 0. The
FOCs that should simultaneously hold in equilibrium are given by equation (A.3):
@
s1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1; 
s
2)
@s1
=
1
144
(48a  5  f1 + f2) = 0;(A.3a)
@
s1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1; 
s
2)
@s2
=
1
144
(8a+ 17 + g1   g2) = 0;(A.3b)
where f1 = 
s
1(112a+98 147s1) and f2 = s2(48a 17+56s1 s2(3+40a+112s1 53s2)),
and g1 = 
s
1(48a 17+28s1) and g2 = s2(32a+36+s1(80a+6+112s1)+s2(12 159s1)).
Equation (A.3) also leads us to
@
s1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1; 
s
2)
@s1

s1=1
=   1
144
(22(a  2) + ah1   s2h2) < 0;
@
s1 ;
s
2
0 (
s
1; 
s
2)
@s2

s2=0
=
1
144
 
17(1  s1) + 8a(1 + 6s1) + 28(s1)2

> 0;
where h1 = (34   32s2(1   s2) + 8(1   s2)2) > 0 for any s2 2 [0; 1], and h2 = (39 +
53(s2)
2 115s2), which is positive at s2 < bs2, or negative at s2 > bs2. Moreover, h1 > h2
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for any s2 2 [0; 1] and a > 2. Thus, an optimal oer cannot be completely inclusive or
exclusive. Similarly, for the case of identical oers, equation (22) leads us to
@s0 (s)
@s

s=0
=
1
36
(3 + 14a) > 0;
@s0 (s)
@s

s=1
=   7
72
(8a  3) < 0;
because a > 2, so neither complete inclusion nor complete exclusion is optimal.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Let e1 and e2 denote the optimal rejection rates in the case of dierent simultaneous
oers: s1 = e1 and s2 = e2. Now impose that the investor makes oers in the sequential
oers case such that 1 = e1 and 2 = e2 (i.e., the investor employs the optimal rejection
rates for the dierent simultaneous oers case and determines how much compensation to
oer to each rm in the sequential oers case which is obviously not necessarily optimal).
We now demonstrate that the investor is already better o by using the optimal rejection
rates for the case of dierent simultaneous oers when making sequential oers. More
formally, we replace s1 and 1 with e1, and s2 and 2 with e2 in equations (11) and
(A.2), and compare the two equations which shows that

1(2)
0 ( e1; e2)  s1 ;s20 ( e1; e2) = (1  e1)(1  e2)144 (8a  18 e2   1):

1(2)
0 ( e1; e2) > s1 ;s20 ( e1; e2) if (8a  18 e2   1) > 0. Given a > 2, (8a  18 e2   1) > 0
at a  19=8. As for a < 19=8, (8a  18 e2   1) > 0 only if e2 < (8a  1)=18.
Figure A1
Sequential versus dierent simultaneous oers
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To demonstrate that, we derive the reaction functions determining the optimal rejection
rate, s2 (
s
1), from equation (A.3), and compare it with   (8a  1)=18, represented by
 for 2 < a < 19=8. Since (A.3) determines the optimal simultaneous oers as a function
of a only, it is sucient to show that e2 <  for all a 2 [2; 19=8]. Figure A1 shows the
behavior of s2 and  in this range which completes our proof such that e2 < (8a 1)=18,
that is, 
1(2)
0 ( e1; e2) > s1 ;s20 ( e1; e2). Hence, a foreign rm can always do better by
making sequential oers than by making dierent simultaneous oers. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Sequential oers vs identical simultaneous oers
Let e denote the optimal rejection rate in identical simultaneous oers: s = e. Now
impose that the investor makes sequential oers such that 1 = 2 = e (i.e., the investor
employs the optimal rejection rate for the identical simultaneous oers case and deter-
mines how much compensation to oer to each rm in the sequential oers case which
is obviously not necessarily optimal). We now demonstrate that the investor is already
better o by using the optimal rejection rate for the case of identical simultaneous oers
when making sequential oers. More formally, we replace s, and 1 and 

2 with e in
equations (21) and (11), respectively, and compare the two equations which shows

1(2)
0 (e)  s0 (e) = (1  e)2144 (8a  18e   1):

1(2)
0 (e) > s0 (e) if (8a  18e   1) > 0. Given a > 2, (8a  18e   1) > 0 at a  19=8.
As for a < 19=8, (8a  18e   1) > 0 only if e <  = (8a  1)=18. Since (22) determines
the optimal simultaneous oers as a function of a only, it is sucient to show that
s <  for all a 2 [2; 19=8]. Figure A2 shows the behavior of s and  in this range
which completes our proof such that e < (8a  1)=18, that is, 1(2)0 (e) > s0 (e).
Figure A2
Behavior of s
Hence, a foreign rm can always do better by making sequential oers than by making
identical simultaneous oers. Q.E.D.
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Dierent vs identical simultaneous oers
Let e denote the optimal rejection rate in the case of identical simultaneous oers:
s = e. As before, we impose that the investor makes oers in the dierent simultaneous
oers case such that s1 = e + ; s2 = e    with   0 (i.e., the investor employs the
optimal rejection rate for the case of identical simultaneous oers except for the small
- and negligible - variation of  and determines how much compensation to oer to
each rm in the case of dierent simultaneous oers, which is obviously not necessarily
the optimal one). We now demonstrate that the investor is already better o by using
rejection rates that are in {neighborhood of the optimal rejection rate for the case
of identical simultaneous oers when making dierent simultaneous oers which shows
that 
s1 ;
s
2
0 (e)   s0 (e) = 0. This completes the proof as it conrms that dierent
simultaneous oers perform at least as good as identical simultaneous oers. Q.E.D.
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